基于分布搜索的传感器指示交接协商机制

针对传感器指示交接技术中"指示任务怎样执行"的问题,根据指示交接的实际过程,研究了多传感器针对多个协作任务怎样进行更好调度的问题,提出了基于分布搜索的多维协商机制。通过协商函数的迭代更新,不断寻找综合效用最大的传感器调度策略,优化了指示交接过程中多传感器多任务调度过程。实例仿真结果表明,所提方法合理、有效,提高了传感器协作的效率,为指示交接的深入研究奠定了基础。     

要地防空导弹飞行试验指挥显示系统的设计

通过对靶场导弹飞行试验发射阵地指挥显示系统的介绍,阐明了试验指挥系统设计的思路、显示内容、建立原则和实现方法,其中重点对系统相关设计和技术实现方法进行了详细阐述。     

基于CPN的TDRS操作规划建模与仿真

以中继卫星(Racking and Data Relay Satellite,TDRS)为研究对象,以有色Petri网(Colored Petri Net,CPN)为数学工具,根据自顶向下的原则和层次化建模思想,提出一种基于CPN的TDRS操作规划模型,该模型分为顶层模型、控制模型、前向链路数据接收任务与发送任务的操作规划模型和返向链路数据接收任务与发送任务的操作规划模型,有效地描述了TDRS的动态行为特性。最后,通过仿真实验得到了TDRS操作规划方案,验证了所建模型的有效性。与PDDL模型比较分析表明:所建模型可以有效引入TDRS的领域知识,能够有效提高求解效率。所建模型可以为TDRS操作规划方案的制定提供理论参考。     

高炮武器系统虚拟射击试验方法

首先介绍了高炮武器系统对空射击精度试验现状,针对传统试验方法存在的成本高昂、组织繁琐、试验周期长等不足,提出了一种基于抽样的虚拟射击试验方法,介绍了虚拟射击试验原理,给出了虚拟射击试验系统结构图,重点讨论了各系统的主要功能,最后给出了虚拟射击试验的数据流分析、组织实施流程和验证思路。     

面向作战仿真的指控系统建模技术研究

重点研究指控系统的建模技术,建立了群指挥所、方面作战指挥所和平台指挥所三级指控系统的模型,并确立了三者之间的层次和控制的逻辑关系。从作战方案和战术响应两方面对指控系统进行"静态的"和"动态的"建模,实现了作战双方基于感知态势的闭环仿真。这些模型在海军某作战仿真系统中得到了应用,仿真实验表明该指控系统模型满足作战仿真系统的作战需求,能够提高作战仿真的真实性和合理性。     

双旋翼直升机旋翼的微多普勒特性分析

目前,国内外对双旋翼直升机的微多普勒特性研究相对还很少。建立了直升机旋翼回波的微多普勒模型,并基于该模型,分别计算了共轴式、横列式、纵列式以及交叉式双旋翼直升机的微多普勒。研究结果表明,不同种类的双旋翼直升机旋翼的微多普勒特性不同,通过对双旋翼直升机旋翼的微多普勒进行分析,可以对双旋翼直升机进行初步分类,为下一步双旋翼直升机的微多普勒识别提供了参考和借鉴。     

基于不同叶片数目比的烟气涡轮多叶片通道数值模拟

基于定常假设,利用混合平面模型传递级间参数,运用Fluent软件对不同静动叶片数目比下的烟气涡轮多叶片通道流场进行了数值计算,得到了温度、压力、出口速度和马赫数等参数的变化规律,绘制了不同静动叶片数目比下各种参数的体积加权平均XY图,并通过数值分析确定了静动叶片最佳数目比为50∶74,最佳静叶安装角为35°。结果表明:叶片数目增减和静叶安装角的变化对烟气涡轮整体性能的影响须考虑多种因素,并不能以单一参数的变化来决定最佳叶片数目和静叶安装角。该结论可为烟气涡轮现有装备的科学管理和技术改进提供理论依据。     

聚氨酯的合成及水声性能

用甲苯-2,4-二异氰酸酯(2,4-TDI)、聚丙二醇(PPG)等原料合成了聚氨酯预聚体,以3,3-二氯-4,4-二氨基二苯甲烷(MOCA)、三羟甲基丙烷(TMP)为扩链剂合成了聚氨酯,在脉冲声管中测试了合成试样的声压反射系数和吸声系数,研究了不同扩链剂及不同含量的2,6-二叔丁基-4-甲基苯酚(BHT)对其水下声学性能的影响。测试结果表明:TDI-PPG-MOCA合成型聚氨酯是一种良好的水下透声材料,TDI-PPG-TMP合成型聚氨酯是一种良好的水下吸声材料;BHT的加入对TDI-PPG-TMP合成型聚氨酯的水下吸声性能有显著提高,因此合理地设计实验工艺参数,可以得到水下声学性能更佳的聚氨酯。     

Poland's national potential and its international position within the European Union – research remarks

This article examines Poland's national potential and its international position within the European Union (EU) with respect to security issues. It presents research results based on a comparison of Poland's national potential as it relates to other EU countries, which is useful when evaluating Poland's power within the EU. The article also evaluates Poland's crisis potential, i.e. it identifies those factors that may potentially be treated as threats to national and regional security. Finally, it enables the identification of challenges to Poland's security in the second decade of the twenty-first century. The research is conducted according to a multidimensional comparative analysis, which is perceived by the author as the best available to measure a country's power despite its weaknesses.     

Planning for the next Takur Ghar

The USA is currently facing an increasingly diverse range of threats, including non-state actors, particularly violent extremist organizations attempting to do harm. The national leadership has made it clear that for the near future it will employ Special Operations Forces (SOF) as the tool of choice in short-duration, high-intensity operations that have more in common with the battle of Takur Ghar, than those with a larger footprint. It is critical then that the lessons of the past are learnt now and are applied before employing SOF in the future. This becomes especially important given the short lead-time in concert with the short-duration/high-intensity tempo of their operations. In the Battle of Takur Ghar, during Operation Anaconda, rigid adherence to the joint functions, especially clearer and more robust Command and Control (C2) and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) in the planning and execution of Operation Anaconda would have yielded a better operational outcome and saved lives. With the benefit of hindsight, many things could have been done differently, but several key issues stand out. The C2 structure must include all components from the outset to synchronize effects and rapidly re-task ISR. There must be multiple communications redundancies and adequate bandwidth. Finally, all SOF, conventional and interagency capabilities must be synchronized under one task force commander with a sufficiently robust C2 infrastructure to direct the entire effort. As our nation calls on SOF at an ever-increasing rate, we must take those lessons learned and apply them to future operations.